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Abstract 
Opportunism is present in professional services and, as a result, organizations adopt 
mechanisms to constrain it. Despite the work on constraining opportunistic consultants, 
researchers have generally ignored the potential impact of national culture on the 
efficacy of constraint mechanisms. Using the theory of relationship constraints (TRC), 
this study examines the effectiveness of different constraint mechanisms for information 
systems (IS) consultants in the United States and China based on different levels of 
information asymmetry, tacit and explicit knowledge. While we found support in both 
cultures for the salience of these dimensions, we also found important distinctions for 
the effectiveness of different constraints between the cultures. Legal constraints are 
more effective in China while social constraints are more effective in the United States. 
While TRC is relevant in both cultures, national culture moderates the effectiveness of 
various constraint mechanisms and highlights the need for additional study. 
Keywords:  Opportunism, theory of relationship constraints, national culture, knowledge type 
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Culture and Opportunism 
Inter-organizational relationships are subject to opportunism, “self-seeking interest with guile” 
(Williamson 1985), which arises because the drive to acquire can overwhelm the drive to bond, two of the 
four fundamental drivers of human behavior (Lawrence 2007; Lawrence and Nohria 2002). Opportunism 
refers to an individual intentionally engaging in actions that they know are wrong (blatant) or refusing to 
share relevant information despite a belief that the sharing is required (passive) (Wathne and Heide 
2000). Opportunism includes “lying, stealing, cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or otherwise confuse” (Williamson 1985, p. 47), the failure to tell the full truth, the actions to 
conform to the letter but not the spirit of the law, and to deliberately induce contract breaches for selfish 
purposes (Williamson 1993). It subsumes the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazards 
(Williamson 1993). Opportunism occurs because humans are only “weakly moral” and will not always 
faithfully honor a contract. As a result, relying upon a legal agreement as an inviolable intention is fraught 
with hazards (Williamson 1993).  
In all cases, opportunism is taking advantage of a trusting relationship to advance self-interest and it 
weakens or destroys social bonds. While the fans of markets often promote the advantages of naked self-
interest, many businesses cannot operate in a purely market mode. They often need long-term mutually 
trusting relationships with other firms (e.g., multi-year consulting engagements) and thus expose 
themselves to opportunism. As a result, societies establish mechanisms (e.g., contract law and 
professional organizations) in an attempt to constrain opportunism.  
Surprisingly, opportunism has rarely been studied cross-culturally (Chen et al. 2002), and there has been 
even less scholarship on the relative effectiveness of constraint mechanisms. Given the adverse 
consequences of opportunism and the multi-level connectivity and interdependence of the two major 
economies, the U.S. and China, and their divide on cultural dimensions (Hofstede 1980), this gap in 
knowledge is worthy of study. Because the cultural cleavage is a potential explainer of opportunistic 
propensity differences between cultures (Chen et al. 2002), it could also clarify differences in the 
effectiveness of opportunism constraint mechanisms. As far as we can ascertain, there has been no 
research examining this issue between any cultures. As opportunism is at the heart of transaction cost 
economics, one of the key theories of organizational research (Mastens 1993), an empirical investigation 
of the relative effectiveness of opportunism constraints in each culture can contribute to understanding 
how to mitigate opportunism in different settings.  
Opportunism exists in professional services (Sharma 1997), and history is replete with examples of 
opportunistic consultants. Frederick Taylor, known as the founder of scientific management and arguably 
the “grandfather of management consulting,” was known to fudge his data, lie to his clients, and greatly 
exaggerate the record of his own success (Stewart 2009). For example, Taylor argued that he could save 
railroads a million dollars a day through the use of greater efficiency but the number was “merest 
moonshine” and was nothing more than a simple ballpark guess based on unsupported and highly 
questionable assumptions (Leopore 2009). Many of Taylor’s well-known efficiency claims, such as the 
famous Bethlehem Steel pig iron loading study, were later discovered to be based on fanciful and ill-
supported assumptions but were foisted upon unsuspecting clients who lacked sufficient information to 
challenge his claims (Stewart 2009). Taylor’s clients were easily persuaded to repeatedly invite him to 
consult for them since they desperately wanted his promised efficiency improvements. However, they 
lacked sufficient information to protect themselves against Taylor’s ill-supported claims. In short, 
asymmetric information allowed Taylor to be opportunistic with his clients. 
Opportunistic consultants also inhabit the field of IS consulting. For example, in 2007, a large technology 
firm, under a USD 1.7 billion contract with the U.S. federal government to install and monitor seven 
intrusion detection devices, reported that all seven had been installed but allegedly installed only three of 
them. This discovery was only made after the four uninstalled devices were found under the desk of the 
consulting project manager (Nakashima and Krebs 2007). In this case, the federal agency, which lacked 
the ability and knowledge to install and monitor the intrusion detection devices, was forced to open its 
gate to the consultant but was subsequently deceived.  
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Constraining Opportunism  
The root cause of opportunism is information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970). If information is completely 
available to both parties and they fully understand it, it is difficult for either to be opportunistic 
(Williamson 1973). A lack of equally shared information obviates the ability of one party from detecting, 
and thus deterring, the opportunistic acts of the other. If information is asymmetrically shared, the 
opportunistic party has little fear of being detected, and thus there is a low likelihood of adverse 
consequences. Therefore, a so inclined information-advantaged party is likely to be opportunistic. 
The type of knowledge that each party holds is an important check on opportunism. Explicit knowledge 
can be captured, formalized, and codified into documents, procedures, or databases (Bassellier et al. 2001; 
Smith 2001). Educated people can, with a modicum of effort, learn relevant explicit knowledge. For 
instance, most office employees can, with adequate effort, absorb the applicable rules of spreadsheet 
operation and manipulation. It does not mean, however, that they will always make good decisions about 
when to use a spreadsheet (e.g., using multiple spreadsheets rather than a database). By contrast, tacit 
knowledge is the know-how and judgment that accompanies explicit knowledge (Polanyi 1967). In terms 
of our example, it is knowing when a spreadsheet is a good fit to the problem at hand rather than applying 
a spreadsheet to all problems. Said differently, tacit knowledge is about knowing when and how to apply 
explicit knowledge. 
Tacit and explicit knowledge are present in all consulting projects, though the mix of each will vary (see 
Table 1). It is the level of each type of knowledge and the holder of the information asymmetry that sets 
the tone for a consulting project. In IS consulting, information asymmetry is bilateral, meaning that both 
parties have information that the other party lacks. Because of this, both parties have the capability to be 
opportunistic. 
Table 1 - Information Asymmetry in IS Consulting (Dawson et al 2010-11) 
 
Several mechanisms have been proposed to constrain opportunism. Agency theory acknowledges that the 
agent (consultant) may have an information asymmetry advantage but this advantage can be overcome 
via legal mechanisms (Eisenhardt 1989). According to agency theory, by using these legal mechanisms, a 
principal has the ability and the knowledge to create and enforce a contract to either oversee the actions of 
the agent or to align the goals of the actions of the agent with those of the principal.  However, agency 
theory falters since IS consulting often uses coproduction, where both the client and the consultant work 
together to deliver the project and, without the involvement of both parties, the project is not delivered 
Holder of Information 
Asymmetry Advantage 
Explicit Knowledge Examples Tacit Knowledge Examples 
Consultant-Favored Knowledge of emerging, 
envisioned technology, or 
application 
Access to additional 
knowledge about a new or 
planned product or approach 
Competitor’s use (or planned 
use) of a new technology 
State of the art project 
management techniques 
Deeper base of experience with a 
particular new/emerging technology 
Greater breadth and depth of 
technology experience 
More experience in process 
adaptiveness 
Broader experience on how technology 
could be employed at the client 
organization 
Client-Favored Knowledge of current assets or 
applications at the client 
organization 
Knowledge of skills of internal 
staff 
Current resource allocation 
Better understanding of the current 
process, challenges and environment 
More insight into change management 
issues associated with service delivery 
within the organization 
Understanding the organizational 
culture and climate 
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(Dawson et al. 2010-11; Mills and Morris 1986). However, agency theory is not appropriate since it 
“neither describe[s] nor predict[s] the behaviors of principals…engage[d] in high levels of collaborative 
problem solving” (Parks and Conlon 1996, p. 836).  
Under the principal-professional lens, consultants (professionals) are believed to have an information 
asymmetry advantage over the client and, due to the type of knowledge used by consultants, this 
advantage is often insurmountable (Sharma 1997). As a result, principals lack the requisite knowledge to 
create and enforce a contract and are thus forced to rely on social constraints to prevent opportunistic 
actions of the agents (Sharma 1997). However, the principal-professional lens also falters in regard to IS 
consulting. With its sole focus on social constraints, it dismisses legal constraints as possible mechanisms 
to control an opportunistic consultant. Further, by only considering consultant information asymmetry, it 
ignores client information asymmetry and the possible resulting client opportunism.  
The theory of relationship constraints (TRC) addresses many of the problems with agency theory and the 
principal-professional lens. TRC considers both legal and social constraints, allows for bilateral 
information asymmetry and proposes that the effectiveness of the constraint mechanism is based on the 
amount of information asymmetry that is present as well as the type and amount of knowledge that is 
used in the project (Dawson et al. 2010-11). By doing so, TRC acknowledges information asymmetry as the 
root cause of opportunism and suggests that the effectiveness of a constraint mechanism is based on the 
level of information asymmetry as well as by the type of knowledge (tacit and explicit). As such, TRC 
suggests that the level of information asymmetry, and the amount of tacit and explicit knowledge 
determine the efficacy of a constraint mechanism. Because TRC considers legal constraints (like agency 
theory) and social constraints (like the principal-professional lens), it is appropriate for this study. 
However, TRC by ignoring national culture, like agency theory and the principal-professional lens, 
implicitly suggest generalizability across cultures. Thus, this research asks, does national culture factor in 
determining the effectiveness of different constraint mechanisms?  
National culture  
National culture, which is defined as the homogeneity of characteristics that separates one human group 
from another (Hofstede 2001), provides a society’s characteristic profile with respect to norms, values, 
and institutions, and affords an understanding of how societies manage exchanges (Hofstede 2001). 
With the fast pace of globalization in business and the increasingly integrated global economy, the role of 
national culture has been the topic of numerous studies focusing on various aspects of human behavior in 
cross-cultural business.  
At the individual level, several studies have investigated the impact of national culture on individual 
behavior, including adoption of innovations (Lim and Park 2013), online review behavior (Lai et al. 2013), 
and computer-mediated communication (Tan et al. 1998). Researches focused on business leaders have 
shown the impact of national culture on leadership effectiveness (Den Hartog et al. 1999; Li et al. 2013), 
managers’ perceptions in project management (Rees-Caldwell and Pinnington 2013), their ethical 
decision-making behavior (Beekun and Westerman 2012) and their perceptions about ethical behavior in 
intra- and cross-cultural negotiations (Elahee et al. 2002). At the firm level, national culture has been 
demonstrated to influence organizational learning (Skerlavaj et al. 2013), entry mode in another country 
(Slangen and van Tulder 2009) and foreign market acquisitions (Malhotra et al. 2011), investments in 
training and development (Coget 2011), capital structure decisions (Li, Dale, Yue and Zhao, 2011), 
knowledge resources sharing in inter-organizational relationships (Griffith and Harvey 2001) and 
formation of technology alliances (Steensma et al. 2000).  
While numerous frameworks of national culture exist, Hofstede’s (2001) work is one of the most widely 
used. Hofstede (2001) identifies five dimensions along which countries can be classified: power distance, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity (more appropriately labeled the gender distribution of 
roles), and long-term orientation. He argues that a country can be positioned along these five dimensions 
to provide an overall summary of a country’s cultural type (Griffith, Myers, and Harvey, 2006). According 
to Hofstede’s national culture index,1 China and the US, the two counties under investigation in this study, 
                                                             
1 Available at Hofstede’s official website: http://geert-hofstede.com/ (last visited on August 5, 2013) 
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have substantially different national cultures. 
In terms of power distance, China is much higher than the US, which means the Chinese culture accepts 
and reinforces the fact that power is distributed unevenly in society. Chinese people accede to status 
differences and are expected to show proper respect to their superiors (Ghemawat and Reiche 2011). By 
contrast, those in the U.S. believe that all individuals, regardless of status or permission, are created 
equally and should be treated accordingly. As a result, in the U.S., organizational hierarchy is a matter of 
convenience while it China it reflects an individual’s status (Hofstede and Minkov 2010). 
For individualism, the U.S. is higher than China, which means the U.S.’s culture shows a relative 
preference for the individual over the group. Compared with their Chinese peers, U.S. residents tend to 
maintain loose social structures that are characterized by independence, the importance of individuals’ 
rights and the recognition of personal initiative and achievement. In China, people think primarily about 
the good of the group rather than that of the individual (Ghemawat and Reiche 2011).  
China ranks lower than the U.S. in uncertainty avoidance, which means Chinese culture is more willing 
to accept and deal with ambiguous or risky situations, while U.S. culture favors structure and 
predictability, which results in explicit rules of behavior and strict laws (Ghemawat and Reiche 2011). As a 
result, businesses in China tend to be small or medium sized and are often family-owned (Hofstede and 
Minkov 2010). 
In terms of the gender distribution of roles, both China and the U.S. rank high on the index. Cultures in 
which some roles are almost exclusively reserved for men are thought to reflect a dominance of tough 
values such as achievement, assertiveness, competition and material success, which are almost universally 
associated with male roles (Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Firms in such cultures put more emphasis on 
employees’ bottom-line performance rather than caring about overall employee well-being (Ghemawat 
and Reiche 2011). 
In terms of long-term orientation, China ranks higher than the U.S. Therefore, Chinese people, compared 
with their U.S. peers, tend to believe that truth depends very much on situation, context and time so that 
they show an ability to adapt traditions to changed conditions, display a strong propensity to save and 
invest, practice thriftiness, and persevere in achieving results (Hofstede 2001). By contrast, those in the 
U.S. adopt a shorter term orientation and this drives individuals to strive for “quick hits” results and to 
also strive to learn the “absolute truth” in all matters (Hofstede and Minkov 2010). 
National cultural values can affect the interests, priorities, and the strategies that people use in dealing 
with their business partners (Brett 2001). For example, firms in societies characterized by a long-term 
orientation tend to be directed toward building long-term relationships with their business partners 
(Barkema and Vermeulen 1997). People in such a culture tend to spend time and effort in establishing 
trust and commitment with their partners over a long series of business interactions, therefore, they may 
refrain from opportunistic behaviors in order not to ruin a relationship, a triumph of the drive to bond 
over that to acquire. 
Other national cultural dimensions such as power distance and individualism have also been found to 
moderate the relation between human development and cheating behaviors such as corruption (Sims et al. 
2012). Variations in individualism are suggested as a potential explainer of differences in opportunistic 
behaviors among cultures (Chen et al. 2002). A meta-analysis by Steenkamp and Geyskens (2012) 
recognizes the relationship between national culture and transaction cost economics, the theory in which 
opportunism is rooted.  
Based on prior theory and empirical analysis, our research proposition follows and is graphically shown in 
Figure 1 
P1. National culture will influence the effectiveness of opportunism constraint mechanisms.  
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Given that TRC, along with agency theory and the principal-professional lens, is silent on national culture, 
it implicitly suggest that national culture is not relevant. We are unable to find prior research testing this 
contention for any of our theory bases, and thus this study fills a gap in two key critical areas of modern 
business, namely cross-cultural behavior and opportunism. 
Methodology and Data Collection  
Policy-capturing studies use regression-based method to discern how individuals make decisions in 
response to a series of stimuli (Aiman-Smith et al. 2002). Based on path significance and regression 
coefficients, a researcher can understand more and better interpret a respondent’s policy-making process. 
Similar methodologies include conjoint analysis or trade-off analysis in marketing (Cattin and Wittik 1983; 
Green and Srinivasan 1990), protocol analysis in information systems (Mackay et al. 1992), contingent 
choice or analytical hierarchical process in social policy research (Mackenzie 1993). Despite the 
distinctions in terminology, differences in the techniques are minimal (Aiman-Smith et al. 2002).  
Operationalization of constructs 
Under TRC, three independent attributes are used to predict the type of constraint mechanism: the levels 
of explicit and tacit knowledge and information asymmetry. We closely followed the TRC definitions used 
in Dawson et al. (2010-11) to operationalize each construct, and used their typology to identify IS 
consulting projects that have varying levels of tacit and explicit knowledge. For each attribute, we use a 
two-level predictor (high/low) for dual reasons. First, our primary goal is to understand the importance of 
each attribute in predicting the perceived efficacy of each constraint mechanism, and a two-level predictor 
provides sufficient insight. Second, the required number of scenarios increases substantially as the 
number of predictor levels rises. Using two-level predictors, the analysis can be conducted with a total of 
eight scenarios, which results in a fully orthogonal research instrument that respondents could reasonably 
be asked to complete. Theoretically, eight scenarios were identified, but during the pilot phase, we 
realized that one was infeasible from a practical sense (discussed later), so it was excluded from 
consideration. 
We are aware that game theory has been used to understand opportunism in contracting situations. 
Under game theory, the strategy of mutual cooperation produces higher payoffs over time than other 
strategies. However, for an initial encounter, competition rather than cooperation is more beneficial 
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). As such, we acknowledge that, over some period of time, participants may 
eventually come to this realization and cease (or greatly reduce) opportunistic actions. Hence, to avoid 
imprecision, in our instructions we notified our participants to assume that this is their first interaction 
with the lead consultant and the consulting firm. By doing so, it was unlikely that either party would 
immediately adopt a cooperative strategy. We readily acknowledge that, if we assumed repeated and 
Figure 1 – Research Model 
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regular interactions between the client and the consultant, our results could be different. While either 
result is potentially interesting, we chose to focus on the early stage of the relationship. 
We conducted the study in the world’s two largest economies, the United States and China. The economic 
activities of both countries are highly intertwined. The United States and China also typify the Hofstede’s 
cultural divide and provide a potential way to understand the relationship between national culture and 
the constraint of opportunism. 
Scenario Development 
Policy-capturing research is dependent on realistic scenarios that match the domain of interest (Aiman-
Smith et al. 2002). We sought initial inspiration for our scenarios from procurements that were listed on 
the State of California’s Procurement Division’s website for active contracts. We identified projects with 
different levels of tacit and explicit knowledge and used several of these projects to create our scenarios. 
Because the procurement documents were so lengthy (ranging from 50 to 200 pages), it was necessary to 
summarize them. Each of the procurement documents used to inspire the scenarios was summarized in 3 
to 4 paragraphs. This use of actual projects as a foundation for the scenarios increased their realism. We 
were not able to identify a procurement to meet one of the requirements: high information asymmetry, 
low tacit knowledge, and low explicit knowledge. As a result, we were forced to create a scenario that met 
these requirements and matched the tone and level of detail of the other scenarios. 
The original scenarios were written and tested in English. A first pilot test with twelve respondents was 
conducted. The respondents were IS consultants or clients known by the first author from his past 
professional career. The first pilot test was a manipulation check to see if the respondents correctly 
associated each scenario with the intended levels of tacit and explicit knowledge and information 
asymmetry. The respondents were provided with a definition and description of all three attributes and, 
for each scenario, respondents were asked to provide an estimate of each attribute’s level. The definitions 
provided were consistent with those used in Dawson et al. (2010-11). In addition, respondents were asked 
to judge the level of realism of each scenario. The results from the first pilot test revealed some problems. 
In several scenarios, the levels of tacit and explicit knowledge were not clear and respondents did not 
consistently and correctly distinguish between high versus low levels of information asymmetry. All of the 
respondents judged the realism of the scenarios to be high, with the exception of the fabricated scenario. 
The respondents argued that they could not envision a case where the information asymmetry would be 
high (reflecting that the client would be very unfamiliar with the project) while the level of tacit and 
explicit knowledge would be low (thus indicating an easy project). Upon reflection, we agreed with this 
viewpoint and dropped the fabricated scenario. While we are aware that this unbalanced our previously 
orthogonal design, removing the fabricated scenario was the right step to take to maintain realism and 
authenticity in responses.  
After these modifications, the revised instrument was sent to eight new pilot testers to judge the 
manipulation levels (i.e., Levels of tacit/explicit knowledge and level of information asymmetry) and to 
assess to realism of each scenario. This time, all judges viewed scenario realism as high. Of the total of 24 
manipulation checks (eight testers each assessing all three manipulations), a total of 22 were correct. The 
probability of getting 22 correct matches out of 24 under a binomial distribution, assuming random 
selection (i.e., p=0.5), is 0.0001, thus we concluded that the scenarios met the research goals. We 
removed the manipulation checks from the instrument and finalized the U.S. version. 
Once the surveys were finalized, we translated them into Chinese using a double back-translation process. 
The seven scenarios were first translated into Chinese by two IS scholars who are proficient in Chinese 
and English and have had studying and living experience in an English-speaking country for more than 
one year. One of the Chinese scholars completed a PhD in an English speaking country and now works 
there. The original seven scenarios were extracted from the U.S. context, which might mean that some 
were not familiar or relevant to Chinese respondents. Minor and necessary adaptations were made. For 
example, in Scenario 2 the client firm was a major bridge builder in the State of California. In the Chinese 
version the client firm was revised to a major bridge builder in China. In Scenario 6, “Christmas” was 
changed to a Chinese equivalent festival, “Spring Festival”, and “60 Minutes and the Wall Street Journal” 
was revised to “China Central Television and national major journals.” Other than that, all the key facts 
were consistent across both versions. Then we asked a language expert who was unfamiliar with the 
research content to translate the Chinese version into English. We sent the back-translation to the authors 
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of the original questionnaire to make sure that the translation was accurate and the changes were suitable. 
Given their feedback and comments, another round of minor revision was done and then we refined the 
translation of English instrument into the final Chinese version.  
We conducted a pilot test with eight MBA students in a Chinese University who were clients of IS 
consultants. We gave them an introduction with the definition and description of three attributes, which 
was adopted from Dawson et al. (2010-11). The purpose was to make sure the respondents understand the 
linkage between each scenario and the underlying levels of tacit and explicit knowledge and information 
asymmetry. The same manipulation check was done in China and revealed that, out of the 24 
manipulation checks, 21 were done correctly. The probability of getting 21 correct matches out of 24 under 
a binomial distribution (assuming random selection of p=0.5) is .001. Thus we concluded that the Chinese 
scenarios also met our research goals. Table 2 summaries the attributes in each scenario.  
 Table 2 - Summary of scenarios 
  Level of 
Number Scenario Info 
Asymmetry 
Explicit 
Knowledge 
Tacit 
Knowledge 
1 Complex software development of a 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) financial 
system 
High High High 
2 Assessment of disaster recovery readiness High Low High 
3 Greening of a data center High High Low 
4 Development of a complex secure electronic 
communications and information processing 
network 
Low High High 
5 Developing and rolling out a new 
organizational structure 
Low Low High 
6 Data center equipment installation Low High Low 
7 Building microwave connectors Low Low Low 
Data collection – United States 
Data collection was first conducted in the U.S. Since the primary people dealing with IS consultant 
opportunism are IS project managers, the instrument was sent to 240 experienced project managers (or 
people holding similar positions) who were part of the first author’s LinkedIn contacts. In keeping with 
policy-capturing protocol (Aiman-Smith et al. 2002), we sent an introductory message that described the 
purpose and process of the research without revealing the proposition. Since all of the respondents were 
experienced in managing consultants, they were simply directed to answer questions based on their 
experience. We also described the source of information for the scenarios since doing so could increase 
the respondents’ perceptions of realism and rigor (Aiman-Smith et al. 2002). 
In particular, we asked each respondent to judge the effectiveness of each of the eight constraints (see 
Table 3) for each of the seven scenarios. The constraints were split evenly between legal and social 
methods. We specifically did not ask them which constraint(s) they generally used; rather, we had them 
focus on how effective the particular constraint would be for a specified scenario. In short, we stressed 
what each respondent believed would be most effective, regardless of how often their organization used 
that or other constraints. As such, our research was designed to be normative rather than descriptive.  
Table 3: Constraints*  
Constraint Definition Source Type 
Firm Fixed Price 
Contract  
A contract where a set amount of work is 
performed for a set price 
Eisenhardt (1989) Legal 
Time and Materials A contract where a client buys a certain Eisenhardt (1989) Legal 
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 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 9 
Contract  number of hours of a consultant’s time 
Purchase Order  A brief contract that specifies the 
product/service to be delivered and its 
cost 
Dawson et al 2010-11 Legal 
Incentive Contracts  An addition to a contract that specifies a 
bonus for certain actions (e.g. faster 
delivery) 
Dawson et al 2010-11 Legal 
Advisor Firm 
Participation (Third 
party control) 
The hiring of another consulting firm to 
help oversee the consultant 
Sharma (1997)  
Dawson et al 2010-11 
Social 
Chain of Command 
(Bureaucratic 
Control)  
The use of the consultant’s chain of 
command within his/her consulting firm 
Sharma (1997)  
Dawson et al 2010-11 
Social 
Self Control  Reliance on a consultant’s personal ethics Sharma (1997)  
Dawson et al 2010-11 
Social 
Professional 
Reputation (Informal 
Community) 
Reliance on the lead consultant’s desire to 
maintain his/her public reputation for 
integrity and honesty 
Dawson et al 2010-11 Social 
* The constraint name provided to respondents is shown in the constraint column. The term within 
parenthesis is what is commonly used in academic literature. 
 
A total of 50 people responded (20.8%) with the completed answers. With policy-capturing research, the 
unit of analysis is an individual response to a scenario. With 50 respondents for seven scenarios, the U.S. 
sample size is 350, which demonstrates sufficient power. Reliability rises and standard error falls if a 
single individual responds to multiple scenarios as opposed to having multiple individuals responding to a 
single scenario (Howell 1992). 
Data Collection - China 
A large-scale survey was conducted in China from May to July 2012. The target respondents were those 
dealing with IS consultants. In the first page of questionnaire we highlighted one item asking whether the 
respondent had working experience as an IS consultant or as a client of an IS consultant. If they had not 
had one of the two experiences, they were excluded. 
We collected data in two ways. First, we solicited contacts from MBA students in the full time MBA 
program in a major Chinese university. Based on the contacts provided by the students, we sent 50 
questionnaires to IS consultants or their clients and received 33 valid questionnaires, leading to a 
response rate of 66%. Secondly, 25 questionnaires were sent out to clients of IS consultants known by one 
of the paper authors from her past professional career, and we received 21 valid responses, leading to a 
valid response rate of 84%. In total, we sent out 75 questionnaires and received 54 valid returns, resulting 
to a valid response rate of 72%. With 54 respondents for seven scenarios, the Chinese sample size is 378, 
slightly larger than the U.S. study and also demonstrates sufficient power. 
For both the Chinese and U.S. data collection, we acknowledge our respondents may be viewed as a 
convenience sample, however, all research favors one goal over another (McGrath 1982). Since our 
primary goal is internal validity, as is the case in a laboratory experiment, we were willing to lower 
external validity in the pursuit of causal precision, the dominant goal when manipulating stimuli and 
measuring outcomes.  
Findings and Interpretation 
Analysis 
We applied a repeated-measures general linear model (GLM) analysis using a restricted maximum 
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likelihood (REML). We first calculated the means for each constraint within each scenario and then 
conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). An assumption of GLM procedure is that the 
underlying errors are all uncorrelated with homogeneous variance. Both data sets satisfy the homogeneity 
of variance assumption when examined using Box’s test (US: p=0.182; China: p=0.461). A MANOVA is 
statistically significant (US: p < 0.01; China: p < 0.01). The effect size, using partial eta squared, indicates 
a moderate effect. In order to test the relationship between each constraint and the three attributes, we 
ran a linear regression analysis (Table 4). 
Table 4 - Regression coefficients and significance 
Source Info 
Asymmetry 
(I) 
Explicit 
Knowledge 
(E) 
Tacit 
Knowledge (T) 
I*E I*T E*T 
Firm Fixed Price Contract 
US 0.162  
(0.346) 
0.108  
(0.275) 
0.117       
(0.239) 
-0.274 
(0.784) 
-0.090 
(0.483) 
-0.207 
(0.107) 
China -0.013  
(0.939) 
-0.035  
(0.711) 
-0.231  
(0.015) 
-0.088 
(0.471) 
0.007 
(0.954) 
0.088 
(0.471) 
Time and Material Contract 
US -0.062 
(0.710) 
-0.023 
(0.831) 
-0.059    
(0.545) 
-0.146 
(0.240) 
-0.122 
(0.327) 
0.086 
(0.490) 
China -0.185 
(0.260) 
0.060 
(0.525) 
-0.115     
(0.227) 
-0.009 
(0.940) 
0.090 
(0.461) 
-0.027 
(0.822) 
Purchase order 
US 0.299 
(0.080) 
-0.110 
(0.265) 
-0.185    
(0.062) 
-0.173   
(0.174) 
-0.267 
(0.036) 
0.161 
(0.205) 
China 0.069 
(0.679) 
-0.031 
(0.746) 
-0.148     
(0.122) 
-0.047 
(0.703) 
0.007 
(0.957) 
0.113 
(0.360) 
Incentive contract 
US -0.615 
(0.000) 
0.312 
(0.001) 
0.094     
(0.333) 
0.383 
(0.002) 
0.354 
(0.005) 
-0.389 
(0.002) 
China -0.142 
(0.386) 
0.276 
(0.004) 
0.106      
(0.263) 
-0.008 
(0.945) 
0.167 
(0.172) 
-0.336 
(0.006) 
Advisor firm participation 
US -0.055 
(0.732) 
0.059 
(0.526) 
0.243 
(0.009) 
0.228 
(0.056) 
0.261 
(0.029) 
-0.245 
(0.041) 
China 0.251   
(0.118) 
0.033 
(0.721) 
0.169     
(0.069) 
-0.053 
(0.659) 
-0.021 
(0.859) 
-0.060 
(0.614) 
Chain of command 
US -0.193 
(0.261) 
0.121 
(0.223) 
0.246   
(0.014) 
0.098 
(0.446) 
0.089 
(0.486) 
-0.257 
(0.046) 
China 0.151  
(0.360) 
0.019 
(0.838) 
0.032     
(0.738) 
-0.153 
(0.213) 
-0.031 
(0.798) 
-0.089 
(0.471) 
Self control 
US -0.033 0.150 0.247    0.015   -0.014 -0.157 
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(0.847) (0.133) (0.013) (0.910) (0.913) (0.222) 
China 0.237   
(0.151) 
0.084 
(0.377) 
0.088     
(0.357) 
-0.205 
(0.096) 
-0.066 
(0.590) 
-0.085 
(0.488) 
Professional reputation 
US 0.068 
(0.667) 
0.197 
(0.033) 
0.583 
(0.000) 
0.179   
(0.131) 
-0.070 
(0.552) 
-0.503 
(0.000) 
China 0.168 
(0.304) 
0.053 
(0.573) 
0.235   
(0.013) 
-0.085 
(0.486) 
-0.097 
(0.427) 
-0.170 
(0.163) 
The first number is the regression coefficient while the numbers in parentheses report its p-value. Bolded cells 
indicate significance at p = 0.05 
Overall, the regression results indicate that the levels of information asymmetry, tacit and explicit 
knowledge explain constraint mechanism effectiveness both in the United States and China. Thus, there is 
support for the central tenet of TRC. As the intention of this paper is to explore culture differences, we 
now use independent samples t-tests to compare the effectiveness of each constraint under each scenario. 
The full analysis, found in Appendix A and summarized in Table 5, shows the differences that distinguish 
the U.S. and China.  
Table 5: Summary of comparative analysis 
Scenario Interpretation of t-tests 
Complex software development of a 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
financial system 
Time and materials contracts and purchase orders are 
significantly more effective in China than the U.S., while chain of 
command and professional reputation are significantly more 
effective in the U.S. than in China. 
Assessment of disaster recovery 
readiness 
Time and materials contracts, purchase orders, and incentive 
contracts are significantly more effective in China than in the 
U.S., while, professional reputation is significantly more effective 
in the U.S. than in China. 
Greening of a data center Time and materials contracts and purchase orders are 
significantly more effective in China than in the U.S., while, 
professional reputation is significantly more effective in the U.S. 
than in China. 
Development of a complex secure 
electronic communications and 
information processing network 
Purchase orders and advisor firm participation are significantly 
more effective in China than in the U.S. 
Developing and rolling out a new 
organizational structure 
Purchase orders are significantly more effective in China than in 
the U.S., while, chain of command and professional reputation 
are significantly more effective in the U.S. than in China. 
Data center equipment installation Purchase orders and incentive contracts are significantly more 
effective in China than in the U.S. 
Building microwave connectors Firm fixed price contract and purchase orders are significantly 
more effective in China than in the U.S. 
 
The results of the t-tests confirm that national culture moderates the relationship between the 
independent variables (information asymmetry, level of tacit and explicit knowledge) and the dependent 
variable (effectiveness of constraint mechanisms). Given that moderators are qualitative or quantitative 
variables that effect the direction and strength of the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables (Baron and Kenny 1986), we can conclude that moderation exists and this provides support for 
our research proposition. 
Overall, we find that firm fixed price contracts, time and materials contracts, and purchase orders are 
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significantly more effective in China than in the U.S. Chain of command and professional reputation are 
significantly more effective in the U.S. than in China. These findings suggest that contractually oriented 
constraints (e.g., Time and materials contracts) are more effective in China, whereas the socially oriented 
constraints (e.g., Professional reputation) are more effective in U.S. A t-test confirms that legal 
constraints are more perceived to be more effective in China (mean=3.58) than the U.S. (mean=3.24) with 
p< 0.001, Social constraints are perceived more effective in the U.S. (mean=3.51) than China 
(mean=3.38), with p = 0.014. We now consider some possible cultural explanations for these findings.  
The divide in the guilt and shame culture (Creighton 1990) between the U.S. and China possibly explains 
the situation. Chinese culture is a typical example of a shame culture where people can do wrong things so 
long as they don’t get caught. This is related to high collectivism where people care about how other 
people in the community see them and low uncertainty avoidance (i.e., people are used to taking 
advantage of ambiguous situations). This may explain why the clients of IS consultants in China prefer 
legal constraints with the consequences of breaking the contract clearly defined. While most western 
countries are classified under guilt cultures, where people feel remorse when behaving badly no matter 
whether they are caught. Thus, socially oriented constraints could be perceived to be more effective in the 
U.S.   
Power distance provides another possible explanation. Chinese culture is a higher power distance culture 
than the U.S. High power distance is associated with respect for authority, centralized decision-making, 
and rigid/authoritative structures (Hofstede 1993; Hofstede 2001; Singh et al. 2005). A senior executive 
in a high power distance culture can have more privileges and is more able to punish subordinates for 
wrong-doings than one in a lower power distance culture (Cho et al. 1998). When dealing with an outside 
consulting company, a manager in a high power distance culture concerned about being possibly blamed 
for not protecting the company’s interest well enough, may choose a rigid structure such as a legal 
constraint. Whereas a manager in a lower power distance culture might be willing to rely more on social 
constraints. 
In both the U.S. and Chinese samples, the effectiveness of constraint mechanisms vary based on the level 
of information asymmetry, tacit and explicit knowledge present. Thus, there is support for the basic 
concepts of TRC. However, the significance of different attributes for the U.S. and Chinese samples and 
the variability of the effectiveness of the constraint mechanisms between the countries suggest the 
importance of considering culture in the understanding of the perceived effectiveness of constraint 
mechanisms. The findings indicate that culture plays an important moderating role. Because the U.S. and 
China differ on several dimensions of national culture, it is difficult to ascertain which dimensions of 
national culture are most salient in the moderation. However, it is clear that national culture influences 
the relationships and this is an important finding from this research. 
Further research is needed to ascertain which of the cultural differences explains the divide between legal 
and social constraints. It might be, however, that given the collective and reinforcing nature of cultural 
factors, we might not be able to go further than showing a difference between the Chinese and U.S. 
cultures.  
Discussion and Summary 
Like all studies, this one has its limitations. First, while we developed the short scenarios from lengthy 
procurement documents and tested their realism, we did not test whether respondents reacted identically 
to the complete document as compared to the précis used as a scenario. Second, we acknowledge that we 
did not test for every possible constraint mechanism and focused on those frequently found in the IS 
literature and practice. Third, we did not attempt to control every possible condition, such as 
characteristics of the client or the consultant. Fourth, information asymmetry covers a multitude of 
omissions in terms of explanatory variables, such as the consultant’s long-term goals vis-à-vis the client. 
There are some things neither party will ever fully reveal, but this is what makes constraints so critical in 
managing relationships and research in this area important and challenging. Fifth, we acknowledge that 
we limited our focus to the initial encounter between the client and consultant. Future encounters, if 
resulting from regular and repeated interactions, may yield different answers. Finally, we acknowledge 
that other theoretical lenses exist and may offer additional insights. 
An implication of the research findings from culture perspective is that even though the world economy is 
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more global and there is greater cross-cultural interactivity between organizations, business best practices 
in one culture may not be effective in another culture. More specifically, the legal constraints that are 
effective in a collectivistic culture in IS consulting may not be effective for an individualistic culture, 
whereas the reverse applies to social constraints As a result, global corporations, when providing IS 
consulting services, should be wary of transporting successful constraint mechanism from one culture 
directly to another. Instead, they need to observe local practices and adapt to these circumstances. 
Specifically, U.S. consulting firms might find that relying on social constraints to limit opportunism in a 
Chinese setting might lead to higher levels of opportunism. Alternatively, Chinese consulting firms 
working for U.S. companies might find that an aggressively legalistic approach to avoiding opportunism 
might damage their professional image and relationship with the client. 
Conclusion 
Opportunism is innate to human behavior because it arises from our drive to acquire, but it is also held in 
check by our drive to bond. Thus, we can expect opportunism to be common to all cultures and also to 
discern in each culture constraint mechanisms.  Nevertheless, cultures vary, and thus they have likely 
developed different culturally apt measures to constrain opportunism. What is surprising, given the 
innate nature of opportunism and the extensive research on agency theory, is that there has been little 
investigation on cultural variations in constraining opportunism. In the context of IS consulting, a large 
global industry, we found that cultural differences exist in terms of preferences for legal and social 
mechanisms for constraining opportunism. We offer several rationales for the findings based upon 
differences in cultural dimensions, but further research is needed to refine this explanation. 
We don’t believe that there is anything peculiar to IS consulting that might suggest that different findings 
would emerge from examining other business relationships. If future researchers find differences, TRC by 
accounting for information asymmetry and type of knowledge provides a theoretical framework for 
explaining the situation. It is also important to recognize that this research is based on an information-
centered theory in that TRC’s three elements are about information-oriented concepts. Thus, this work is 
a contribution to the practice of IS consulting and the theoretical development of IS. 
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Appendix A 
Independent-samples T test on the comparison of Chinese and U.S. samples 
Constraints China US Levene’s 
Test for 
equality of 
variances 
T Testa 
(Significance) 
Mean (Std. 
Deviation) 
Mean (Std. Deviation) Sig. 
Scenarios 1 (High Info Asymmetry, High Explicit Knowledge and High Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.31 (1.146) 3.18 (1.137) 0.787 0.601 (0.549) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.43 (0.924) 2.80 (1.178) 0.016 2.999(0.003) 
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Purchase orders 3.69 (0.907) 2.50 (1.249) 0.003 5.498(0.000) 
Incentive contracts 3.43( 0.964) 3.64 (1.045) 0.683 -1.087(0.280) 
Advisor firm participation 3.69 (0.843) 3.96 (0.903) 0.941 -1.606(0.111) 
Chain of command 3.07 (0.949) 3.52 (0.814) 0.805 -2.563(0.012) 
Self control 3.24 (0.910) 3.52 (0.909) 0.991 -1.565(0.121) 
Professional reputation 3.35 (1.031) 3.92 (0.695) 0.000 -3.317(0.001) 
Scenarios 2 (High Information Asymmetry, Low Explicit Knowledge, High Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.39 (0.979) 3.55 (1.174) 0.177 -0.764(0.447) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.39 (0.856) 3.00 (1.021) 0.332 2.102(0.038) 
Purchase orders 3.61 (0.878) 2.80 (1.190) 0.038 3.924(0.000) 
Incentive contracts 3.36 (0.896) 2.94 (1.008) 0.527 3.681(0.000) 
Advisor firm participation 3.89 (0.861) 3.86 (1.155) 0.095 0.159(0.874) 
Chain of command 3.55 (0.902) 3.61 (0.786) 0.363 -0.389(0.698) 
Self control 3.70 (1.021) 3.53 (0.892) 0.411 0.912(0.364) 
Professional reputation 3.83 (1.041) 4.20 (0.790) 0.194 -2.037(0.044) 
Scenarios 3 (High Information Asymmetry, High Explicit Knowledge, Low Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.58 (1.072) 3.67 (1.029) 0.633 -0.427(0.672) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.51 (0.903) 3.02 (1.127) 0.032 2.414(0.018) 
Purchase orders 3.72 (0.919) 3.22 (1.177) 0.032 2.350(0.021) 
Incentive contracts 3.58 (0.960) 3.51 (1.175) 0.097 0.355(0.724) 
Advisor firm participation 3.51 (0.924) 3.31(0.983) 0.645 1.082(0.282) 
Chain of command 3.26 (0.828) 3.14 (0.788) 0.890 -0.902(0.369) 
Self control 3.40 (0.876) 3.41 (0.814) 0.628 -0.071(0.943) 
Professional reputation 3.47 (0.983) 4.00 (0.645) 0.000 -3.252(0.002) 
Scenarios 4 (Low Information Asymmetry, High Explicit Knowledge, High Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.53 (1.238) 3.12 (1.189) 0.959 1.713(0.090) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.60 (1.034) 3.60 (1.125) 0.632 0.018(0.986) 
Purchase orders 3.64 (0.913) 2.94 (1.219) 0.031 3.301(0.001) 
Incentive contracts 3.36 (0.954) 3.20 (1.069) 0.856 0.799(0.426) 
Advisor firm participation 3.30 (1.191) 2.76 (1.153) 0.896 2.354(0.020) 
Chain of command 3.17 (1.004) 3.50 (0.863) 0.391 -1.791(0.076) 
Self control 3.36 (1.048) 3.58 (0.702) 0.009 -1.275(0.206) 
Professional reputation 3.42 (1.054) 3.58 (0.756) 0.048 -0.921(0.359) 
Scenarios 5 (Low Information Asymmetry, Low Explicit Knowledge, High Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.40 (0.958) 3.40 (1.229) 0.034 -0.017(0.986) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.55 (0.837) 3.44 (0.993) 0.306 0.597(0.552) 
Dawson et al./Impact of Culture on Constraints 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 17 
Purchase orders 3.47 (0.838) 2.78 (1.148) 0.034 3.487(0.001) 
Incentive contracts 3.55 (1.038) 3.46 (1.199) 0.139 0.397（0.692） 
Advisor firm participation 3.38 (1.169) 3.28 (1.341) 0.076 0.395（0.693） 
Chain of command 3.32 (0.906) 3.78 (0.887) 0.511 -2.608
（0.010） 
Self control 3.38 (0.995) 3.62 (1.048) 0.673 -1.211（0.229） 
Professional reputation 3.70 (0.903) 4.22 (0.840) 0.477 -3.046
（0.003） 
Scenarios 6 (High Information Asymmetry, High Explicit Knowledge, Low Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.81 (0.779) 3.38 (1.105) 0.001 2.303
（0.024） 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.87 (0.754) 3.52 (1.054) 0.002 1.936（0.056） 
Purchase orders 3.69 (0.886) 2.96 (1.142) 0.148 3.632
（0.000） 
Incentive contracts 3.89 (0.883) 3.96 (1.009) 0.765 -0.383
（0.702） 
Advisor firm participation 3.07 (1.211) 2.82 (1.224) 0.813 1.064（0.290） 
Chain of command 3.30 (1.002) 3.56 (0.837) 0.116 -1.450（0.150） 
Self control 3.37 (0.938) 3.44 (0.907) 0.587 -0.384
（0.702） 
Professional reputation 3.31 (1.025) 3.52 (0.886) 0.373 -1.088（0.279） 
Scenarios 7 (Low Information Asymmetry, Low Explicit Knowledge, Low Tacit Knowledge) 
Firm fixed price contract 3.89 (1.022) 3.12 (1.317) 0.001 3.276
（0.001） 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.76 (1.008) 3.57 (1.041) 0.575 0.930（0.355） 
Purchase orders 3.74 (0.894) 3.22 (1.123) 0.057 2.592
（0.011） 
Incentive contracts 3.33 (1.197) 3.24 (1.199) 0.976 0.374（0.709） 
Advisor firm participation 3.00 (1.259) 2.67 (1.214) 0.862 1.337（0.184） 
Chain of command 3.26 (0.994) 3.35 (1.071) 0.749 -0.431
（0.668） 
Self control 3.20 (1.053) 3.16 (1.067) 0.956 0.193（0.847） 
Professional reputation 3.20 (1.105) 3.16 (1.106) 0.670 0.185（0.853） 
Over all scenarios 
Firm fixed price contract 3.560 (1.048) 3.346 (1.178) 0.000 2.577(0.010) 
Time and materials 
contracts 
3.587 (0.914) 3.280 (1.112) 0.000 4.042(0.000) 
Purchase orders 3.651 (0.888) 2.916 (1.194) 0.000 9.334(0.000) 
Incentive contracts 3.539 (0.998) 3.424 (1.136) 0.001 1.443(0.149) 
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Advisor firm participation 3.405 (1.110) 3.236 (1.236) 0.003 1.931(0.054) 
Chain of command 3.275 (0.945) 3.533 (0.871) 0.167 -3.822(0.000) 
Self control 3.379 (0.983) 3.467 (0.917) 0.124 -1.247(0.213) 
Professional reputation 3.468 (1.034) 3.801 (0.898) 0.000 -4.614(0.000) 
a. For Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances, if p﹥0.05 we used equal variances assumed T-test for equality of 
means, if p＜ 0.05 we use equal variances not assumed T-test for equality of means.  
